

Nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation

Away Day presentation and discussion on 7 February 2019 - van der Nootska

The nuclear team identified current and near term priorities. They also presented ideas on longer-term activities focussing specifically on where they could consider synergies within the Cluster but also cross-Cluster activity possibilities.

- Currently the team are focussed on the follow up for the report prepared for Hiroshima Prefecture on Setting the Stage for Progress Towards Nuclear Disarmament. The follow-up report focuses on nuclear disarmament verification and was prepared by Petr, Tytti and Ugne. The main goal is to identify analytical approaches and tools for operationalizing nuclear disarmament. This means practical near term steps for nuclear disarmament verification measures based upon previous and current initiatives. The report also includes a case study prepared looking at verification challenges of the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW).
- On the topic of verification, SIPRI Associate Senior Fellow Bob Kelley has prepared two manuscripts in the queue for the editorial process. One paper is a technical comprehensive overview of the dismantling of South Africa's nuclear weapons and production infrastructure. The other publication is more of a policy focus looking with what Bob Kelley has catalogued as lessons learned for verified nuclear programme dismantling. This examined the case studies of South Africa and Iraq and to what extent lessons can be learnt or can be applied to verifying the denuclearization in the future of North Korea.
- The other topic on the nuclear team's agenda is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that is very much in jeopardy following announcement of US withdrawal. SIPRI Associate Fellow Tarja Cronberg is currently preparing two blog pieces, one looking at the state of the debate inside Iran on the JCPOA based on Tarja's research trip there in September 2018. The second piece addresses the challenges facing Europe and efforts to salvage or revive the JCPOA. Also JCPOA related, Tytti has prepared a project proposal that has been sent out to several funders focusing on international concerns about Iran's missile programme. In this context, two future priorities/potential projects are identified: First, to look at Europe and see how they play a role in understanding the concerns about Iran's missile programme. Second, to engage Iran and other regional actors, in discussions about missiles and perhaps a bigger discussion about conventional and nuclear arms in the region. This work can have some obvious intra-cluster cooperation. Pieter Wezeman for example has already looked at the broader context of conventional arms and how Iran fits into this. If we do have discussions with

regional actors on the strategic security situation, relevant researchers from the MENA programme should that get underway should be involved.

- A third area of work includes the traditional focus on arms control treaties, including the INF treaty. The nuclear team are helping to co-organise with the *European Leadership Network* (ELN) a seminar to be held in Berlin, in the spring, titled ‘Arms Control and the European Security Post-INF’. The purpose is to look at what the demise and end of the INF treaty means for European security and the future of arms control in Europe and to generate new ideas for cooperative security alternatives. This of course involves logical synergies with the European Security Programme.
- Looking ahead at longer-term research priorities and similar to what was done previously by SIPRI is examining once again the future of the arms control agenda through a major publication. In 2001 SIPRI published ‘A Future Arms Control Agenda’ and perhaps it is time to write something new looking at the arms control agenda after the post-Cold War world. It’s not going to look like the agenda we have now and we need to take into account new technology factors and new strategic factors and actors. Moreover, this exercise could lead to a good deal of cooperation and input from other programmes in the cluster. Besides this it was mentioned Petr has just recently prepared a concept note looking at the evolving nuclear doctrines and nuclear force posturing of China, India and Pakistan and verifications for strategic stability. Early stages but something we can push forward with a regional approach to arms control issues and strategic stability broadly defined.
- The nuclear numbers currently used in the SIPRI YB are highlighted as an issue that needs further examination. Specifically the numbers we report on nuclear forces, global inventories of nuclear weapon holdings, and how many nuclear delivery vehicles and associated warheads each of the nine nuclear states have. It is perhaps time for SIPRI to consider if this is a task we should be doing in-house. This would involve bringing in specific expertise and would require financial investment. The benefit though is this would allow SIPRI to have control of the data production and transparency in terms of the methodology. Not necessarily a complex undertaking but just needs to be consistent across case studies and importantly have a formalised consistent methodology that can be followed and is not dependent on a single individual and we build up an internal institutional memory.